Faisal Hassan

Women's attendance of mosques - a summary of the issue: It is important to acknowledge that the default ruling of women attending the mosque, as demonstrated in the time of the Prophet (peace be upon him) in both action and statement, is permissibility. This is indicated in the report of the Prophet (peace be upon him) saying, "Do not prevent the women of God from God's places of worship." (Bukhari and Muslim) When Abdullah ibn Umar relayed this statement to one of his sons, his son argued that he will prevent them, so Ibn Umar rebuked him strongly saying that he just quoted to him the words of the Messenger (peace be upon him) yet he is still saying he will prohibit them. (Muslim) One of the wives of Umar ibn al-Khattab would attend the Fajr and Isha prayer. When asked why she attends despite knowing her husband does not like it, she said she knows why Umar does not stop her from going, and that is due to the statement of the Prophet (peace be upon him). (Bukhari) Now if someone acknowledges that the default ruling in the time of revelation, as explicitly stated by the Prophet (peace be upon him), is permissibility of women attending the mosque, then the only question is whether there is any strong reason to depart from this default status - in a way that considers both short-term and long-term harms in preventing women attending mosques, and that is actually consistent with how women engage in society and occupy spaces in every other domain. Otherwise, one is simply altering the ruling set out by the Messenger of God (peace be upon him). Furthermore, changing the default ruling of permissibility based on some preventative measure (Sadd al-Dhari'ah) is a ruling from necessity, as it is effectively altering something permitted by Allah and His Messenger (peace be upon him) - something which requires great caution (and its application is restricted based on the principles of necessity). To copy-and-paste a fatwa in the past here is also not appropriate, as that fatwa is not speaking about our context, time, or region. Just as those in the past spoke of their context, we must speak of ours, and that is permissibility of women attending mosques in accordance with the default permission from the very time of revelation. As for the famous statement of Aishah (may God be pleased with her), not only is her statement not an explicit prohibition of women attending the mosque (rather than it is a rebuke of the actions of some women in attendance), but the other Companions also did not view it to be a reason to prevent women from attending the mosque. In other words, if some women happen to be doing something they should not be doing, then simply address that action (with reminders of correct etiquette and modesty) rather than a blanket prohibition that was also not legislated by the Messenger of God (peace and blessings upon him). Arguing for absolute prohibition for all women on account of a wrong by some is not only inappropriate (and a misapplication of prohibitions through preventative measures - i.e. Sadd al-Dhari'ah), but it also reflects a superficial assessment of anyone looking at long-term consequences of their community. When women exist in every space of society - and go to restaurants, city centers, or have an ordinary stroll in the park - it makes little sense to say: "You can go to all these places... but not the place you serve God." That is simply inconsistent and sounds silly to anyone reasonable. Finally, it is important to remember that just as men experience the need to attend the mosque and become connected with God through reminders, sermons, and Quranic engagement, women experience the same need. Believers cannot aspire to have women who are learned and have a relationship with God if they are prohibited from the very places that serve to develop that?

I uploaded a video on women's mosque attendance and hadiths on permissibility. https://youtu.be/whwk2y1n5lw?si=53OTTF7DXc7FytvF This is an excerpt from my Usul al-Fiqh series where I was addressing baseless arguments of prohibition from Sadd al-Dhari'ah (a preventive measure). I hope you enjoy! 🙏❤️ Timestamps 00:00 - Women's attendance of mosques 03:57 - Addressing the famous report of Aishah 05:32 - The face covering (niqab) and related arguments

In an interesting episode of Law from the last century: The Egyptian jurist Sh. Muhammad Abu Zahrah (d. 1974) - famously known for his biographies of notable classical imams - caused a stir in 1972 when he came out with a controversial view at a Fiqh conference, saying that he kept this conclusion to himself for two decades and has only announced it now! Sh. Qaradawi (d. 2022) - who actually disagreed with Sh. Abu Zahrah's view - says that he reflected on this for a while, and he asked himself: from a psychological perspective, why might anyone keep a view to themselves for such a long period and not mention it in any lesson, lecture, book, or article? He goes a step further and says: how many bold views must exist that a person keeps to themselves, such that the views die alongside them, never escaping the person's lips and consequently never being heard nor ever transmitted from them? Sh. Qaradawi says it is for this reason that when speaking about ijtihad, he stresses the importance of building an environment in which scholarly viewpoints can be heard and expressed, while recognising that a scholar might get things wrong (as scholars are human and can make mistakes), and that it is only this way that scholarship is able to develop. (في وَداع الأعلام، للقرضاوي)

Who was the legend Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064)? Ibn Hazm hailed from Andalusia in a wealthy family. He was notably a Dhahiri jurist with a heavy literalist bent. While this naturally resulted in strange legal conclusions, Ibn Hazm was otherwise an intelligent and outspoken personality, willing to reflect on things outside the box. Since he was not part of the dominant legal traditions of his time, he was willing to freely criticise popular views he believed were absurd - often very harshly! As a result, there are contrasting attitudes towards Ibn Hazm even among contemporaries. Some believe that his views should be dismissed entirely and given no consideration, though in scholarly contexts this is not really an appropriate attitude to adopt. A trained jurist would rather assess each disagreement on its own merit, and if it happens to be unsound then it would be judged unsound, but the ideas and thoughts would not be rejected wholesale. Ibn Hazm was a scholar, no doubt. He appears to have never left Andalusia, yet still managed to gather a large body of knowledge across a wide range of sciences: including Literature; Poetry; Philosophy; Comparative Religion; History; Law; and Hadith. Being the controversial and outspoken figure he was, he was exiled from his city and his books were called to be burnt. Nevertheless, he still managed to retrieve his books as he committed much to memory. He is described as recalling this in his famous lines of poetry - where he essentially says: you may be able to burn my books, but you will never burn the knowledge within me; it shall come with me wherever I go, and likewise join me in my grave. Despite the efforts against Ibn Hazm, his books still exist almost a millennium later, representing a large body of knowledge across sciences and a distinct legal tradition. While Ibn Hazm's legal works including his famous al-Muhalla can sometimes be insightful and a source for classical law, his legal writing is really only recommended for advanced students for two reasons: (i) he can teach a false sense of confidence to beginners in his legal conclusions, due to his commitments and legal disposition, and (ii) he can be quite harsh in his criticism when that harshness is not warranted, which may not develop the best attitude in readers. Beyond that, Ibn Hazm is famously known for his book on love and romance: Tawq al-Hamamah (also translated into English as: The Ring of the Dove). This appears to be an early work of Ibn Hazm sharing insight into the world of 5th-century Andalusia. In this work, Ibn Hazm philosophises about love and shares personal anecdotes, stating that he will only cite reliable incidents either he himself has witnessed or that have been relayed to him by trustworthy individuals. The work can also be characterised as a book of love psychology, as Ibn Hazm explores the nature of love and its causes. Its manuscript (which is actually a summary of the original rather than its complete form) appears to have been found and popularised back in 1914 by the Western academy, and has been translated into several languages including English; Russian; Italian; French; Spanish; Dutch; and Turkish. May Allah bless Ibn Hazm and show him mercy. He was certainly a colourful character! ❤️🙏

The legend Ibn Hazm (d. 456) is an interesting figure... On the one hand, he's notorious for his harsh criticisms in his writing. On the other hand, he's authored a book on love and romance! 😂 I would've loved to spend time with him! رحمه الله

An interesting historical point regarding outspoken scholars in the past is the impact their temperament may have had in them being vocal about their views. Scholars like Ibn Hazm (d. 456), Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728), and Suyuti (d. 911) were notably outspoken and tolerated social backlash on account of that. Each had a daring quality and boldness about them that allowed them to freely share their views. This point on temperaments is also noted by contemporaries like Sh. Yasir al-Matrafi (in his book on Ibn Taymiyyah) and Sh. Abdullah al-Daghistani (in his edition of Suyuti's ijtihad works). It is also why when discussing ijtihad, some emphasise the need to possess a degree of institutional independence to ensure they are free to express themselves.

It is the nature of legal principles and methodology (i.e. Usul) that they can be reasoned entirely through first principles, and then packaged to a non-specialist audience using both rational and universal arguments and without necessarily have to appeal to Arabic terminology. However, when these Usul are not truly understood by those appealing to them - or simply studied descriptively rather than prescriptively - they end up becoming Arabic buzzwords or a defense mechanism for legal doctrine by presenting them as inexplicable concepts of law derivation. In other words, they conveniently become fairy-dust arguments for Law that serve no practicality besides vague appeals. A nice litmus test I would share on this is: can you explain each concept to a non-specialist using universal language? This is also something I had in mind when teaching the Usul al-Fiqh course. I often recall the teaching attributed to the famous Richard Feynman: if you can't explain something in simple terms, you probably don't understand it.

Very nice to see this from the Syrian legend Sh. Mustafa al-Zarqa (d. 1999)! Sh. al-Zarqa says, after sharing his permissive view on a topic, that there will be some who find his conclusion here strange... as though anything that indicates flexibility and ease in their life is abnormal... as though the purpose of Law is not truly achieved except by imposing hardship and difficult, when in reality this is an easy-going and undemanding Law that is built on the principle of ease and removal of hardship.

Abu Hurayrah reported that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "God will raise the rank of a righteous servant in Paradise and he will say, 'My Lord, how did I receive this?' He will reply, 'By your child seeking your forgiveness.'" (Ahmad and Ibn Majah)

It is often easy to forget how much of an impact one's network has on the legal views they follow. The only way any view can fit within the remit of validity for most people is if they're informed of that view from their network (and rightly so), but this naturally means that the less one expands their network, the less likely they are to hear of what they would otherwise deem acceptable. A diverse network serves to offer different perspectives on issues, while a uniform network can restrict one's outlook and serve as an echo chamber (though admittedly also offers clarity for some).

Here's a funny anecdote from Sh. Yusuf al-Qaradawi: He says a scholar once told him that he visited a country and found a pile of stones in their washrooms. He asked the people there the reason behind that and they said, "We use the stones to clean ourselves, reviving the Sunnah (i.e. this is what the believers did in the time of revelation)." Sh. Qaradawi says if these people truly want to "revive the Sunnah" in this way, they should lay down pebbles in mosques "following the Sunnah"; leave mosques open with no doors, allowing dogs to come in and out "following the Sunnah"; and to build the roof from palm leaves and fibre and to use oil lamps "following the Sunnah"! 😂

'Musical Instruments: Exploring the Main Arguments | Book Summary of Sh. Abdullah al-Judai' https://youtu.be/FI_cH9X7wTY?si=a4yK5j2dYLa2Bk6r I hope you find this new upload insightful. May Allah bless you! 🙏❤️ Timestamps: 00:00 - An introduction to the book and topic 07:30 - How to correctly understand related terminology 10:40 - Introductory points on instruments and entertainment 19:10 - Are there any Quranic verses on instruments? 31:20 - How exactly are the hadiths on instruments understood? 01:08:00 - Is there a juristic consensus (ijma') on instruments? 01:15:40 - Are there any additional arguments for permissibility? 01:21:30 - Exploring related topics to singing and dancing 01:26:40 - Final comments on the chapter of entertainment

Noteworthy contemporaries who argue for the permissibility of musical sounds (when they are not coupled with other associated prohibitions, as no jurist permits them in that case) include: - Sh. Abu Zahrah (d. 1974) - 'al-Fatawa' 796-798 - Sh. Ali al-Tantawi (d. 1999) - 'al-Fatawa' 106-111 - Sh. Farid al-Ansari (d. 2009) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CFzy4agZAnE - Sh. Yusuf al-Qaradawi (d. 2022) - 'al-Halal wa al-Haram fi al-Islam' 369-375, 608-615; and a dedicated work: 'Fiqh al-Ghina' wa al-Musiqa' - Sh. Abdullah al-Judai - 'al-Musiqa wa al-Ghina fi Mizan al-Islam' - Sh. Hatim al-Awni - alongside his public posts and articles, he has two series both compiled here: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUe0RLDDSvKOnkNlBJmi7PZNsnZZc7GPi There are others too whom I have intentionally not mentioned (notwithstanding those classical jurists who likewise argue for permissibility and have spoken on the topic at length). I believe from this list, Sh. Abdullah al-Judai and Sh. Hatim al-Awni have the best presentations on the topic and arguably make the strongest case. Naturally, their expertise in hadith judgements gives them the edge as they are able to identify and account for all the data that are indeed authentic. For those who would like something in English, I have delivered an hour-long presentation on the topic in the past. I will share this publicly for the first time tomorrow InSha'Allah.

A popular misconception on Law is that different legal conclusions are simply based on whether one deems a specific hadith to be authentic. While it is true that different conclusions can be a result of the data one has in front of them (i.e. which hadiths they believe are authentic), that is not the sole reason for scholarly differences. In reality, to assume that is the case is likely just a result of literalistic tendencies, because if one starts from a position where they believe there is only one interpretation to be drawn from a hadith based on a rigid assessment, they would naturally believe everyone is forced into that single interpretation after believing the text is authentic. That legal differences are not solely based on hadith judgements is not only demonstrated from classical jurists in their legal texts but also works dedicated to explaining reasons for scholarly disagreement. To share a contemporary example on musical instruments: It is a common assumption that the view of intrinsic permissibility (and extrinsic prohibition - i.e. only if coupled with other prohibitions does the use of instruments become prohibited, like lyrics disrespecting God) which is held by both classical scholars and contemporaries is simply due to whether the popular hadith cited by Imam Bukhari is authentic (there is a lot of discussion on whether Imam Bukhari himself believed the report to be authentic and the capacity in which he cites it which is not the focus here). In reality, however, the disagreement is not simply based on this alone, as it is possible to argue that the hadith (with its specific wording) is authentic while still arguing for intrinsic permissibility. In fact, to share an example, Sh. Albani (d. 1999) authored a work on musical instruments arguing for prohibition (which is not a problem in principle, although I believe some of the arguments in this work are strange). In this same work, he praises the detailed hadith assessment of all related hadiths by the contemporary Sh. Abdullah al-Judai, who later argued for permissibility. (Some background: before authoring his work on the topic that includes both his hadith and legal assessment, Sh. Judai first authored a work dedicated to just the hadiths, highlighting which reports are authentic without sharing his legal conclusion.) In other words, both Sh. Albani and Sh. Judai are working from a very similar set of data (with differences between themselves that the latter also shares in his work), yet in terms of the law derived from that data (i.e. the hadiths) and how to understand them, they arrive at drastically different conclusions. That is to say that the legal assessment is different to the hadith assessment, and authentication alone is only half the job for law derivation.

"Is celebrating birthdays displeasing to God?" Celebrating birthdays is neither prohibited nor recommended. It is simply cultural with no religious association, and falls under base permissibility or discouragement depending on how it is done. The authentic report from Anas ibn Malik on God substituting two pre-Islamic festivals in Madinah for Eid al-Fitr & Eid al-Adha is open to interpretation and can arguably be understood as: (i) Referring specifically to pagan festivals which are prohibited and substituted for the two days that commemorate what is truly righteous and pleasing to God. (ii) Referring to the best type of festivals that are connected directly to God and which should be given most attention, rather than prohibiting all non-religious and customary celebration which should be acknowledged as being less important. In other words, this report is not a conclusive text on prohibition, contrary to what is commonly assumed. Even linguistically, 'substituting' (ibdal) does not necessarily indicate prohibition, similar to the Israelites who wanted to substitute Manna and Quail for vegetables which does not necessarily mean they wanted Manna and Quail to be prohibited for themselves. Having said that, as per the second meaning drawn from this hadith, it is important that the two Eids be made the most special days of the year, particularly for children. I do not believe it is appropriate for believers to have a weaker connection to the two Eids than any other day of celebration in the year. This is in addition to some extravagant celebratory forms being questionable. In principle, however, the celebration itself is arguably not prohibited. And Allah knows best.

I was asked the other day if I plan the things I post on this channel. 😅 Truthfully, many of the posts I share are influenced by conversations I've had or a question posed to me that I think carries wider benefit. Otherwise if an interesting thought crosses this mind palace and I think you lovely people may find it insightful, it goes in the drafts somewhere and I write on it later. Unfortunately, some things don't make it on the channel 😂

The hierarchy of Laws is something that pervades all juristic activity, as juristic reasoning (fiqh) entails recognising priorities and the structure of Law. Not only does this idea influence how hadiths are interpreted, but can also influence their authenticity. To share two hadith examples from Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 597): 1) In a popular and alleged hadith, the Prophet (peace be upon him) is described as saying that a single dirham of riba is worse than thirty-six instances of fornication (or in another report: the lowest form of riba is like fornicating with one's mother!). Ibn al-Jawzi says this hadith is inauthentic. Why? Not only due to concerns in transmission but also the fact that a single dirham of riba is clearly not worse than thirty-six instances of fornication in its harm and consequence. The consequence from a single dirham of riba clearly does not outweigh even one act of fornication, let alone thirty six. In other words, this contradicts the very principle of the hierarchy of Laws and emphasises an act more than it deserves, both rationally and juristically, and cannot therefore be authentic. قال: ﻭاﻋﻠﻢ ﺃﻥ ﻣﻤﺎ ﻳﺮﺩ ﺻﺤﺔ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻷﺣﺎﺩﻳﺚ ﺃﻥ اﻟﻤﻌﺎﺻﻲ ﺇﻧﻤﺎ تعلم ﻣﻘﺎﺩﻳﺮﻫﺎ ﺑﺘﺄﺛﻴﺮاﺗﻬﺎ، والزنى ﻳﻔﺴﺪ اﻷﻧﺴﺎﺏ، ﻭﻳﺼﺮﻑ اﻟﻤﻴﺮاﺙ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺴﺘﺤﻘﻴﻪ، ﻭﻳﺆﺛﺮ في اﻟﻘﺒﺎﺋﺢ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﻳﻮﺛﺮ ﺃﻛﻞ لقمة ﻻ يتعدى اﺭﺗﻜﺎﺏ نهي، ﻓﻼ ﻭﺟﻪ ﻟﺼﺤﺔ ﻫﺬا. 2) In another hadith, it is said that at the end of times there will be a people who dye their hair black and they will not be allowed to smell the fragrance of Paradise. Ibn al-Jawzi argues that this cannot be authentic, because alongside a question in transmission, dyeing the hair black is not a major prohibition by any means to warrant such a threat as it carries little consequence. Furthermore, this is assuming dyeing hair black is even prohibited (as this is a point of scholarly disagreement from the very first century, with the report of Abu Quhafah being subject to different interpretations and validly argued to pertain to the elderly). Accordingly, Ibn al-Jawzi argues that this is not authentic, though notes that if it were authentic, the act of dyeing the hair black would simply be a description for those people incurring the threat rather than the reason the threat is applied to them. Again, Ibn al-Jawzi recognises the hierarchy of Laws in accordance with their harm and consequence, and engages with the hadith accordingly. قال: ﻭاﻋﻠﻢ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻗﺪ ﺧﻀﺐ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﺤﺎﺑﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺴﻮاﺩ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ اﻟﺤﺴﻦ ﻭاﻟﺤﺴﻴﻦ ﻭﺳﻌﺪ اﺑﻦ ﺃﺑﻲ ﻭﻗﺎﺹ ﻭﺧﻠﻖ ﻛﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺎﺑﻌﻴﻦ، ﻭﺇﻧﻤﺎ ﻛﺮﻫﻪ ﻗﻮﻡ ﻟﻤﺎ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺪﻟﻴﺲ، ﻓﺄﻣﺎ ﺃﻥ يرتقي ﺇﻟﻰ ﺩﺭﺟﺔ اﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﻢ ﺇﺫا ﻟﻢ ﻳﺪﻟﺲ ﻓﻴﺠﺐ به ﻫﺬا اﻟﻮﻋﻴﺪ، ﻓﻠﻢ ﻳﻘﻞ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﺃﺣﺪ، ﺛﻢ ﻧﻘﻮﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮ اﻟﺼﺤﺔ: ﻳﺤﺘﻤﻞ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ اﻟﻤﻌﻨﻰ ﻻ ﻳﺮﻳﺤﻮﻥ ﺭاﺋﺤﺔ اﻟﺠﻨﺔ ﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻳﺼﺪﺭ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﺃﻭ اﻋﺘﻘﺎﺩ، ﻻ ﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺨﻀﺎﺏ، ﻭﻳﻜﻮﻥ اﻟﺨﻀﺎﺏ ﺳﻴﻤﺎﻫﻢ، ﻓﻌﺮﻓﻬﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﺴﻴﻤﺎ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻗﺎﻝ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺨﻮاﺭﺝ: ﺳﻴﻤﺎﻫﻢ اﻟﺘﺤﻠﻴﻖ، ﻭﺇﻥ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻖ اﻟﺸﻌﺮ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺑﺤﺮاﻡ. To give a third contemporary example: Shaving the beard is argued to be prohibited by many scholars classically, while a point of scholarly disagreement that I do not intend to lay out at this moment. However, even if argued to be prohibited (and should be avoided), it cannot be described as a major violation in the hierarchy of Laws as it does not carry much harm or consequence nor is it emphasised as such in any single hadith. To present it like it belongs among the major violations is a complete misunderstanding and naturally leads to heavy cognitive dissonance about the nature of Divine guidance. The same can be said about many acts that are prohibited (and by definition should be avoided): depending on where the act is placed on the hierarchy of Laws - which ultimately goes back to its degree of harm and consequence at varying levels in society (as noted by the likes of al-Izz Ibn Abd al-Salam and Ibn Daqiq al-'Id) - it must be given its appropriate and corresponding share of force in the context of advocacy. Otherwise, it is misrepresenting Divine guidance and what it emphasises, as though the 23-year period of revelation came for a single second-tier prohibition collapsing every notion of priorities. May Allah bless you, and He Most High knows best.

An important principle of hadith interpretation that prevents cognitive dissonance: When there is a prohibition in a hadith that is coupled with a great threat, that great threat indicates that the prohibition is linked to something that corresponds to great harm and consequence in proportion to that threat, as the gravity with which the act is coupled indicates that what is prohibited is a high priority within the hierarchy of law which is why it is given considerable focus to begin with. To share an example, the hadiths on hanging lower garments below the ankles contain a great threat, but that threat would not be appropriately understood if it were simply linked to the mere act of hanging lower garments free of any ill intention, as that is more appropriately tied to a matter of simple dress etiquette (adab) and involves no negative consequence whatsoever. On the other hand, understanding that threat as being associated specifically with arrogance - in which case the act is not prohibited in its absence (as also indicated in hadiths and argued by most scholars classically) - corresponds with the threat in the hadith, as arrogance is a grave act for which one would expect significant attention and the associated threat. This principle is probably one of the highlights in the work authored by the Hadith scholar of Makkah, Sh. Hatim al-Awni: النظرُ المقاصديّ وضوابطُه وأثرُه في إثباتِ الرواية الحديثيّة وتأويلِها. It is also noted by Sh. Ali al-Tantawi (d. 1999) when discussing the hadith on plucking eyebrows, which has much discussion and serves as a nice case study of how Fiqh operates.