Zeinab Al Saffar | The Lines

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‎🟢 From the Brazilian coup of 1964 to the scene in Latin America today, the slogans change and the tools are repeated. ‎From "fighting communism" to "protecting human rights"... Has the American approach changed? ‎@ZSaffar

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The war has revealed divisions within the administration, institutions, and both American parties. The rise of J.D. Vance reflects the growing influence of the "America First" movement, while the victory of Chris Pappas indicates the expansion of the progressive movement that rejects unconditional support for Israel and the influence of traditional lobbies. 12. Assessment of Alliances of Both Sides The American-Israeli alliance has a fundamental institutional and material advantage, but it faces a divergence of objectives. The "axis of resistance," on the other hand, relies on a flexible network that distributes pressure between Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, preventing isolation on any front, despite differences in capabilities and calculations. Conclusion: The War Horizon and the Balance of Power The strategic balance is relatively tilted in favor of Iran, not because of its military superiority, but because of its success in preventing its subjugation and turning time into a tool of attrition. The more Washington fails to achieve its objectives, the more Iran's resilience becomes an advantage, and the more American dominance, which cannot be translated into political gains, becomes a cumulative burden. @ZSaffar

❗️ The Iranian War Horizon - 7/8/2026 Brief Overview 1. Comparison of the Positions of Both Sides The United States maintains a significant military and technological advantage, as well as a broad regional presence, but its bases have become fixed targets for Iranian missiles and drones. Conversely, Iran has maintained its cohesion and asymmetric capabilities, successfully preventing a decisive American victory and turning the military presence into a logistical and financial burden. 2. Comparison with Similar Historical Cases The war is replicating experiences from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, where Washington achieved battlefield superiority without achieving sustainable political goals. Iran appears more complex due to its geography, institutional cohesion, and possession of regional leverage, which pushes towards a pragmatic settlement rather than submission. 3. Citing Expert Opinions Experts agree that it is difficult to overthrow the Iranian regime or dismantle its capabilities through air strikes. While Washington can inflict significant military damage, it lacks a guaranteed path to translate this into a political victory, making deterrence and negotiation the most realistic options. 4. Study of Escalation Management Patterns of Both Sides Washington employs "gradual coercion," combining sanctions, threats, negotiations, and force to improve its terms. Iran, on the other hand, is working to disrupt this path by targeting bases, activating regional fronts, and utilizing the Strait of Hormuz, making American pressure potentially counterproductive to Washington and its allies. 5. Study of Losses and Recoverability Washington has suffered significant losses in air, intelligence, and logistical assets, which are expensive to replace, while Iran has demonstrated greater flexibility in restoring its asymmetric capabilities, despite its limited economic resources. Therefore, a return to war depends on both sides' ability to replenish ammunition and maintain readiness. 6. Analysis of Motivations and Public Opinion The motivations for the war have gone beyond the nuclear issue to include restoring American deterrence, protecting Israeli dominance, and weakening Iran's regional position. However, the decision was influenced by overconfidence and a lack of clear objectives, and it has faced opposition from the public and institutions, limiting the administration's ability to prolong the conflict. 7. Analysis of Unexpected Options for Both Sides Washington may resort to limited ground operations, special forces deployments, or an exceptional nuclear escalation, while Iran may expand the closure of maritime corridors, strike oil infrastructure, and target logistical bases. The danger lies in a sudden move that breaks escalation protocols and triggers a full-scale regional war. 8. Analysis of the Temporal Accumulation and its Impact Time has become a factor of attrition for the United States due to the consumption of ammunition, rising energy costs, and logistical challenges, while Iran has benefited from it by restarting its facilities and maintaining a significant portion of its arsenal. The longer the war lasts, the less beneficial it becomes and the greater the pressure on Washington. 9. Analysis of the Discourse of Both Sides American discourse relies on threats, ambiguity, and exaggeration, but it has suffered from a loss of credibility due to the failure to achieve a decisive victory. In contrast, Iranian discourse has been concise, linking statements to field operations, and establishing equations of retaliation, resilience, popular unity, and comprehensive deterrence. 10. Analysis of the Side Effects of the War The war has weakened American power, prompted allies to reassess the value of the American security umbrella, and has affected energy, inflation, supply chains, and the financial system. The costs of the conflict have shifted to the United States, causing increasing economic and political pressures. 11. Study of Political and Party Cohesion

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industrial base's ability to quickly replenish them, with some defensive systems requiring long periods to rebuild. The most dangerous limitation of the U.S. war effort is not the absence of combat platforms, but the possibility of insufficient munitions to operate those platforms at the required level. The United States is seeking to address the munitions crisis, but it cannot produce a quick solution that necessarily meets the needs of the ongoing war of attrition. It is taking action on three levels: • Replenishing current stockpiles: Necessary, but slow to have an impact. • Expanding industrial capacity: A deeper solution, but it will take years. • Changing the nature of the weapons system: A long-term strategic solution that reduces reliance on expensive and limited munitions. - U.S. forces have changed command locations, withdrawn or vacated some forward bases, redistributed forces and munitions, moved aircraft, used alternative bases, and enhanced defenses, deception, and camouflage. These measures do not simply mean that the United States is strengthening its power; they also reveal that it is adapting to a threat that has forced it to change its deployment pattern. - U.S. adaptation in the field is both a sign of flexibility and a sign of increased pressure. Withdrawing bases reduces casualties but increases costs. Logistics, and the dispersal of aircraft protect them, but it increases operational distances and fuel requirements, while the distribution of forces reduces the risk of strikes, but it complicates command and control. - The Iranian strikes have forced the United States to rethink how it positions, protects, and sustains its forces. They are not only measured by what they destroy, but also by what they force the United States to change after the strike; the way its forces are deployed. - The longer the war lasts, the more ammunition, force protection, and redeployment become critical factors in the course of the war, and it becomes increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain operations at the same level, even with its continued technological military superiority. - Iran does not need to eliminate American military superiority; it is sufficient for it to make the cost of using and sustaining that superiority higher than Washington's ability to bear it, in order to achieve its war aims. #Iran @ZSaffar

🟢 Brief Summary: The US Munitions Problem, U.S. Force Protection, and Their Impact on the War's Trajectory This paper examines the munitions problem, the protection of U.S. forces, and their impact on the trajectory of the U.S.-Iran conflict. It frames the issue within the context of a declining ability to sustain the war due to the simultaneous consumption of munitions, pressure on bases, and the dispersal of forces across multiple theaters. The paper argues that the U.S. problem is no longer about its ability to deliver powerful strikes against Iran, but rather its ability to sustain those strikes and bear their costs. - Intense strikes have not led Iran to fundamentally change its position, but rather have contributed to its hardening. Meanwhile, the munitions problem, base limitations, and military dispersal are imposing constraints on U.S. options. The central question has become: "Can the United States continue the war at the same level of intensity and for the duration needed to achieve its political objectives?" - Iran has successfully shifted the war from a U.S.-style "decisive" model to an attrition model that suits it better. Consequently, U.S. technological superiority alone is no longer sufficient to win the war. The United States wants to shorten the war, and the longer it lasts, the more important the problem of resources and U.S. sustainability becomes. - U.S. military superiority is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain due to declining stockpiles, reduced readiness of some naval vessels and aircraft, and financial, personnel, and logistical pressures. Continued war means further erosion of the ability to maintain a high level of power for an extended period. - The war has revealed a gap between tactical success and strategic success. The United States can destroy many targets, but it cannot necessarily force Iran to surrender or change its position. Each additional round of bombing consumes additional munitions. Therefore, while air strikes achieve increasing destruction, they do not guarantee a commensurate political resolution that justifies their cost. All potential U.S. military options have problems. * Air strikes and sanctions are the least costly military option in terms of direct costs, but they are limited in their ability to achieve the political objective. * A ground operation could address the problem of air strikes not being decisive, but it creates a larger problem of ground involvement and human casualties. * A nuclear strike has political, legal, ethical, and environmental constraints, in addition to its international and global implications. Therefore, the more the United States needs a decisive outcome, the higher the cost of the military option; and the lower the risks of military action, the lower the ability to achieve a political resolution. - The war consumes not only munitions and forces, but also the financial resources needed for operations, restocking, base maintenance, and readiness. This indicates a shift in costs from direct operational spending to long-term sustainability costs. Here, the economy becomes part of military capability itself, rather than just an external factor. - U.S. naval power is distributed between the Middle East, Europe, the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and elsewhere, while facing problems of maintenance, shortages of parts, and munitions. The more theaters the United States must cover, the less its ability to concentrate power in a single theater for an extended period. - The movement of aircraft between Europe, the United States, and the Middle East shows that the United States can quickly withdraw forces from the front lines and redeploy them when necessary. This gives it significant operational flexibility. However, this flexibility comes at a cost; it relies on a vast network of bases, fuel depots, and logistical support. - The rapid consumption of munitions, especially air defense missiles and precision-guided weapons, is outpacing the U.S.

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Although Hayman acknowledges that a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian agreement is unlikely under current conditions, he believes Israel should at least demonstrate political willingness and present a future political horizon, even if a final settlement remains unattainable for now. In his view, such a political horizon may be essential for facilitating regional integration and expanding cooperation with neighboring states. • The Next Government and Elections Hayman argues that Israel’s next government will face two major strategic challenges: Rebuilding a sustainable long-term relationship with the United States. Developing a comprehensive regional political initiative that moves beyond relying solely on managing military threats. He cautions that an excessive focus on immediate security threats risks overlooking deeper structural changes unfolding over the long term. Conclusion The central message of Hayman’s remarks is that Israel’s strategic challenges are interconnected rather than isolated. Iran’s nuclear program, the Palestinian issue, relations with the United States, international isolation, brain drain, and growing academic and economic pressure all interact within a single strategic framework. According to his assessment, Israel may be capable of addressing each threat individually. However, it will face increasing difficulty if it loses the international political and diplomatic environment that has enabled it to effectively leverage its military strength for decades. Consequently, Hayman concludes that Israel’s greatest strategic danger lies not only in the capabilities of its adversaries, but also in the gradual erosion of the international political environment that has underpinned its security. Preserving the relationship with the United States, restoring international support, reintegrating into the region, and advancing a credible political vision have therefore become components of national security no less important than military power itself. @ZSaffar

• Declining Support for Israel Is a Multi-Dimensional Trend Hayman rejects the argument that declining support for Israel stems solely from the Gaza war. He believes broader transformations are taking place within American society, including political and cultural polarization, increasing extremism on both the right and the left, and the rise of movements hostile either to Israel or to Jews. In his view, Israel therefore faces a dual challenge: weakening support among segments of the political left while simultaneously confronting rising antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment within parts of the far right. • The Crisis of Jewish and Zionist Identity in the United States Hayman notes that many young American Jews increasingly feel uncomfortable or afraid to openly express their Jewish or Zionist identity because Zionism is increasingly associated with fascism or with Israeli government policies. He therefore argues that Israel should avoid alienating American Jews with differing political or religious views and should seek to maintain relationships across the broadest possible spectrum of American Jewish communities, including those outside Orthodox Judaism. • Israel Needs a New Strategic Vision Hayman argues that Israel cannot overcome its current challenges through military power alone. Instead, it needs a political and strategic vision that presents it as a small, innovative country striving for peace and security. According to him, such a vision should include: A political horizon for resolving the Palestinian issue. A broad regional initiative. Expansion of the Abraham Accords. Stronger relations with Arab and regional states. Restoring Israel’s image as a source of regional stability rather than instability. He adds that the precise details of any future settlement are less important than demonstrating a clear political direction showing that Israel has not abandoned the pursuit of a negotiated solution. • Europe: A Strategic Partner That Has Been Neglected Hayman warns that Israel has neglected its relationship with Europe. He notes that the war highlighted Israel’s dependence on European supply chains and security-related components. Consequently, he argues that rebuilding relations with Europe should become a strategic priority rather than treating the continent as secondary to Israel’s security. • The Middle East: Reshaping the Regional Order Through Diplomacy Hayman believes the Middle East is undergoing a period of regional transformation, offering Israel an opportunity to shape that process rather than merely react to it. He proposes pursuing this through: Expanding the Abraham Accords. Establishing security arrangements with Syria and Lebanon. Beginning with limited and gradual agreements even in the absence of a comprehensive settlement. Strengthening regional economic and security cooperation. Reintegrating Israel into the regional framework. He stresses that regional integration is not simply a diplomatic objective but an essential component of Israeli national security. • Changing Israel’s Regional Image Hayman argues that Israel faces a serious image problem across the Middle East, where some countries increasingly view it as a destabilizing force. He believes military power alone cannot change this perception and that Israel must demonstrate its ability to serve as both a security and economic partner for regional states. • After 7 October: Diplomacy Is Part of National Defense Hayman advocates a broader concept of national security that extends beyond military strength to include politics, diplomacy, economics, and society. Within this framework, political and diplomatic initiatives—such as expanding the Abraham Accords or establishing arrangements with Syria and Lebanon—can themselves enhance security by reducing sources of threat and creating supportive regional partnerships. • The Palestinian Issue: It Cannot Be Completely Bypassed

🟢 Tamir Hayman’s Remarks at the National Security Conference – Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) 27 July 2026 • War with Iran: Military Strikes Alone Do Not Produce Strategic Change Hayman argues that continued military strikes against Iran are of limited value unless they alter the Iranian regime’s behavior or strategic calculations. He warns that escalating attacks without achieving political results could instead strengthen Iran’s determination to continue the confrontation and reinforce the regime rather than weaken it. Therefore, he believes the continuation of the war should be subject to constant assessment of the strikes’ effectiveness, while keeping open the option of halting operations and reassessing the situation. • Two Benchmarks for Success in the War Against Iran: The Nuclear Program and Regime Survival Hayman identifies two primary indicators for determining whether the war succeeds or fails: Iran’s nuclear program, particularly whether Iran continues developing its nuclear capabilities to a level that Israel considers unacceptable. The fate of the Iranian regime, specifically whether the war leads to its collapse or fundamental change. He argues that these two factors will ultimately determine whether Israel will be forced to fight another war with Iran in the future. • Comparing the 2025 and 2026 Wars According to Hayman, the key difference between the two wars lies in expectations and political outcomes. The previous war was limited in scope and focused primarily on Iran’s nuclear program and military capabilities, allowing it to be viewed as having achieved specific objectives. By contrast, expectations for the current war were much higher, with hopes that it would fundamentally reshape the Middle East. Since that has not yet occurred, Hayman believes this explains why the Israeli public feels less secure than it did following the Twelve-Day War. Consequently, he argues that although the current war may presently appear unsuccessful from a domestic perspective, a final judgment should await the end of the campaign and a broader assessment of its results. • Israeli Security: Military Achievement Does Not Necessarily Equal Strategic Success Hayman criticizes assessments of the war based solely on immediate military damage inflicted on the enemy. In his view, the true strategic measure is whether military operations have altered Israel’s surrounding political and security environment. Weakening an adversary’s military capabilities, he argues, is insufficient unless it produces lasting political and strategic change. • The United States: Declining American Support Is the Greatest Strategic Threat Hayman considers the gradual erosion of American support for Israel to be a greater long-term danger than some direct military threats. He argues that Israel has relied for decades on an American political, military, and diplomatic “safety net,” but that this support is beginning to weaken. He attributes this trend to several factors: Declining support for Israel among younger Americans. Growing political polarization within both major U.S. parties. Increasing sympathy for the Palestinian cause. Reduced support even within parts of the Evangelical community. The possibility that these trends will eventually shape future U.S. policy as political leadership changes. Accordingly, Hayman believes the problem extends beyond relations with the current U.S. administration and reflects a deeper, long-term shift in American society and politics. • The Greatest Risk: Depending on a Single U.S. Administration Hayman warns that Israel would be making a strategic mistake if it viewed its strong relationship with the current U.S. president as a long-term guarantee. Administrations change, whereas broader social and political trends endure. He therefore calls for building a durable institutional relationship with the United States while preserving bipartisan support, rather than relying primarily on the personal relationship between the Israeli prime minister and the American president.

Over the past two days, the Israeli Navy conducted a large-scale military exercise, described as one of the largest naval drills in recent years, to simulate multi-front attacks targeting ports, energy facilities, and commercial ships along the coast and in the Red Sea. According to Israeli media, the exercise includes scenarios involving the launch of missiles and drones at gas platforms and ports, as well as attempts at naval infiltration and operations involving commando forces, all while preparing to counter simultaneous attacks from multiple fronts. The drills also simulate defensive operations extending from Naqura in the north to the port of Ashdod in the south, as well as the Red Sea off the coast of Eilat, with the participation of missile boats, submarines, naval commando units, and the Air Force.

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