Ummati أمتى

The rear bases which keep Israel supplied stand to lose much more from instability in the Gulf states than they do from attacks on Israel. To summarize, hitting Israel does much to address the root causes of the state Israel than striking the more vulnerable parts of the system upon which Israel depends.

Gulf States as an Organ of the Zionist World System A number of Muslims have criticized Iran's recent targeting of GCC states, questioning why they are not focusing on Israel. Although Iran is a wicked, deviant, disbelieving state that should not be supported by Muslims, we should not underestimate their strategic intelligence or vision. Israel is the most heavily fortified point in a system with multiple parts or "organs." There are multiple organs which, if they experienced catastrophic failure, could cause the entire system to fail. The Gulf states are one such organ. Multiple functions of the system depend upon the stability of the GCC. Energy markets Political stability in Gulf countries helps keep energy prices down. This is important for the EU (which still has a lot of technological interdependency with the US) and China. As Chinese exports become increasingly important for the global economy, serious instability in global energy markets has ripple effects that can potentially lead to civil unrest like the protests that lead to the Arab spring. This is very relevant for US power, as the US plays the role of the global police -a role largely assigned by Jews. Especially at a time where access to the rare earths required for precision weaponry is increasingly contested, the threat of potential uprisings against Western client states like Pakistan, Morocco, or Jordan becomes more acute. This also has major implications for Israeli weapons systems, especially anti-air and air superiority missiles. Consumption and investment Some argue that the US is not dependent on Gulf oil and actually benefits from high oil prices as an oil exporting country. This overlooks the enormous capital flows from the Gulf to the West by way of consulting contracts, military exports, and revenues of Western multinational corporations operating in the GCC - not to mention the many investments by GCC sovereign wealth funds in American capital markets. Labor market The Gulf absorbs a large amount of laborers from the Indian subcontinent, and remittances sent home account for a large share of the GDP of India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh. The stability of this region and its subservience to Western interests is foundational to Western imperial power, and these remittance flows play a vital role in that stabilization. Currency stability Although its influence is declining, the petrodollar still generates massive demand for USD, which in turn causes people and institutions around the world to purchase dollars and dollar-denominated debt. This is the "base layer" of the global financial system. It gives a lot of leverage to US financial institutions (which are largely under the influence of Jews) These institutions can issue credit (which can be used to attack smaller regional currencies), and it amplifies the impact of sanctions imposed by the US, since the need to access to dollar denominated credit and settlement networks is baked into the global economy. Strategic waterways The modern Gulf states trace their roots back to British interventions against Muslim pirates in the region around 200 years ago. This was not unique to the Gulf - the Mediterranean was also filled with Muslim pirates, which triggered the US's first international military action. This was not specific to Asha'irah or Atharis - Muslims everywhere who sincerely seek to implement the religion will view plundering the wealth of kuffar as a blessed source of income. The liberal world order, which depends on commerce, must prop up regimes that suppress authentic Islamic impulses. Drawing fire: Attacking Israel just deplenishes stocks of weaponry and personnel which are then replenished from the rear bases of the Jews. The concept of "drawing fire" of an enemy to clear operational space for other actions is a basic principle in modern military tactics. The more hated Israel becomes internationally, the better able it is to fulfill this role.

The Problem of Popular Support in Modern Jihad Given the situation of the Muslims, it is to be expected that the mujahideen of our era, may Allah grant them success, have adopted modern strategies of asymmetric warfare. The most prominent of these theories is the leftist theory of guerilla war, developed by theorists and revolutionary leaders such as Vladimir Lenin and Mao Zedong. It is natural that the mujahideen would be influenced by these strategies, not only because of the heavy influence of socialism on Arab nationalist currents that gripped the Muslim world in the aftermath of the foundation of the Zionist state, but also because these theories provided the best template for victory against a world order dominated by the Jews and Crusaders. Adoption of these strategies did indeed help to achieve major victories against the Jews and Crusaders, including the humiliating withdrawal of the Crusaders from Afghanistan, but it also led to a divisive controversy and ultimately deviance. In the early days of the war in Syria, a number of the mujahideen criticized the trend of referring to the struggle of the Muslims as "revolution" rather than jihad, or calling the conquest "liberation" rather than "opening" or fath. Guerilla war relies first and foremost on popular support, so it has limited compatibility with an explicitly religious jihad. It is much easier to rally a whole population on the basis of national identity and quality of life than it is to do so on the basis of tawheed and shahada in the path of Allah, because a large portion of the population are hypocrites or weak in iman. It would be unfair to say the the mujahideen copied leftist theory - there are many unique innovations in the Islamic approached to modern asymmetric warfare. However, we have to acknowledge the influence that this theory has had, not least because of theological assumptions it is based upon. Leftist theories of guerilla warfare are heavily influenced by Protestant and humanistic philosophical trends. Hegel, one of the biggest influences on Marxist theory, explicitly viewed the divine as being manifest in humanity. When this concept transfers to political theory, it leads to a worldview where social transformation comes from inside the human, rather than from an absolutely transcendent God. Humanity is both the means and the end in this worldview; the purpose of history is the liberation of humanity, and humanity is the means by which liberation is achieved. This leads to the kind of compromises which litter the ideological battlefield of modern Islamic politics, including the appeals to Christians and rafidha and other disbelieving groups, the excuses for delaying the implementation of hudud, and abandoning global jihad in favor of national politics. Awareness of this problem and its ideological roots is a necessary precondition for the development of an authentic Islamic theory of modern asymmetric warfare. My own preliminary beliefs is that such a theory will have to rely heavily on demographic engineering by means of hijra; both hijra in the shari' sense, and using mass immigration as a geopolitical weapon. And Allah knows best.

By the grace of Allah, I'm happy to announce the (much delayed) publication of my book on the history of feminism. This book explores the origins of feminism in Christian theology and European history, as well as also the vital role it plays in maintaining the political and economic order of the modern world. The book is intended to call the Muslims and humanity to Allah and His religion by helping us to realize how inseparable belief is from modes of production, and to realize the problems (and the beliefs) inherent in modern modes of production. By the permission of Allah, I hope this will contribute to protecting and healing Muslim communities suffering from the effects of so-called "gender equality," and help readers to recognize and appreciate the divine wisdom of Islam in the process. Link to purchase paperback or ebook: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0H7D6BH95/ Link to download pdf: https://archive.org/details/why_am_I_single

Visible realities of tawakkul So many realities in Islam are counter-intuitive at first, but are actually manifestly visible upon further analysis. For example, the sahaba, radhi Allahu anhum, used to consider marriage, including marriage to additional wives, as a means of seeking rizq, whereas many today think that they can't afford to take additional wives. At first it might seem like this is a matter of faith and the ghayb, and it is to some extent. However, if you consider it, you can also see this reality at action. When you are single or have a small number of dependents, it is easy to be satisfied with your situation and relax. However, when your number of dependents increases, suddenly you have to find new ways to provide for them. This may push you to be more thrifty or efficient in your use of resources, to increase in du'a and activities that increase rizq such as silat ar-rahm and umrah, to branch out and make new connections, learn new skills, or generally just push yourself harder. Of course everything is written and Allah can also decree rizq for His slave without the use of asbab, but this reality does not negate the presence of these visible effects. And baraka in these visible effects may be part of the reality of Allah azza wa jalla distributing rizq according to the number of dependents. In reflecting upon this reality, we can see the destructive effects of modern Western thought in causing people, including Muslims under the sway of Western hegemony, to delay marriage, having children, or to decide against taking additional wives due to fear of financial hardship. Because Christian thought located the divine in the human, Westerners developed an obsession with control, such that they try to plan for every eventuality, making sure they have enough money for raising children, college, potential medical emergencies, and so on and so forth. Simply going ahead and marrying can be akin to the (possibly inauthentic but nonetheless inspiring) story of Tareq bin Zaid burning the ships after landing on the shores of al Andalus. In many cases, high pressure situations can bring out the best in people and lead to discovering talents and abilities they did not know they had. This principle applies to jihad as well - in the jihad in Sham many humble construction workers or shawarma sellers discovered they had innate military talent and rose through the ranks to become leaders. This points to the wisdom of Allah in legislating jihad and the tremendous waste of neglecting it. The flames of war not only expose the hypocrites and purify sins, they can also bring out the best in people in terms of noble characteristics such as heroism and self-sacrifice, as well as practical skills and ability.

Responding to objections to asymmetric jihad One points many overlook about the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah when using it to justify modern diplomacy is that it was built upon unity of Islamic authority. The 16th point of the saheefah of Madina, which was a key part of establishing the first Islamic state under Rasulullah ﷺ, reads: وأن سلم المؤمنين واحدة لا يسالم مؤمن دون مؤمن في قتال في سبيل الله إلا على سواء وعدل بينهم. "And the peace of the believers shall be one. If there be any war in the way of Allah, no believer shall be under any peace (with the enemy) apart from other believers, unless it (this peace) be the same and equally binding on all” Sulh Hudaybiyyah did entail leaving some Muslims at the mercy of the mushrikeen, but these were Muslims already under the authority of the mushrikeen. As for Muslims who had political authority or warmaking capacity, it did not strengthen the mushrikeen in any way against them or give them any room to outmaneuver them. On the contrary, the moment the Quraysh attacked *allies* of the Muslims, the sulh was invalidated. This means that while it brought some difficulty to some Muslims, it did not *weaken* the Muslim collective in any way. Today, many treaties made by Muslim majority nation-states are justified by Hudaybiyyah, but unlike Hudaybiyyah, they free up the hands of the kuffar so they can more effectively wage war against Muslims elsewhere. In many cases, these treaties even entail cooperation with the kuffar against Muslims, completely lacking the spirit of unity of the original Muslim community and the sulh of Hudaybiyyah. Secondly, I don't know where people get the idea that Muslim women and children were not at risk in the wars against the mushrikeen. Sumayya bint Khayyat of course was the first shaheed of Islam, and it was unferstood that women were taking risks by embracing faith. It was also common for Muslim women to accompany armies in support roles, putting them at risk. Abdullah ibn Abu Zubayr along with the ulema of Mecca also made the choice to fight the army of Yazid despite knowing the city would be bombarded by catapults and that children and women would be put at risk. Warfare at that time, as now, often entailed risk to children, particularly mass starvation since movement of armies often exhausted food reserves and disrupted agricultural production. In fact, casualties among women abd children were often much higher than in modern guerilla warfare, yet no one suggested that this might justify allowing the kuffar to be dominant over Muslims. This brings us to an even more important point - the issue of iman. Iman increases with obedience zo Allah and decreases wirh disobedience. Part of this process is actually visible - abandoning jihad and accepting the dominance of kuffar over Muslim lands has led to the rise of an educational system that systematically undermines iman. People mock me for saying that Muslim countries in the Arab world need to become more like Somalia and Afghanistan, but this is a proven path to military victory over the West. We must reject every variant of the "Meccan phase" argument that suggests we must become as passive as the Muslims in Mecca were. The ayat of jihad were not revealed at that time, so there was no sin on the Muslims for refusing to fight. There is sin on us now, because even if the ability to fight is not present in a given country, the ability to finance jihad and emigrate to other countries is present. All of the "weighing of lesser evils" that justifies current submission to the Judeo-Christian world legal and economic system fails to take into account the dramatic corruption of the religion occurring today not only through the educational system (itself an extension of the technological/economic system), but also the horrific effects of technology on the spread of fasad, kufr, and fahisha. Jihad, even imperfect jihad, is absolutely the only thing that can stop the spread of this cancer.

It leads to dependency on the enemy by forcing us into impermissible alliances and cooperation with the enemy to build technological capacity, and it leads to neglect of religion by prioritizing the study of natural sciences and math over the study of religious sciences. So now let's weigh the harms of these two strategies against each other. Option A: Terrorism -possible spilling of impermissible blood -possible violation of covenants Option B: Developing modern states and industry -certain replacement of sharia with Judeo-Christian law (nationalism), which is kufr -certain assistance of disbelievers against Muslims (may be major or minor fisq depending on details) -certain abandoning of jihad for an undefined duration Most knowledgeable people acknowledge that nationalism is kufr, but many argue it is permissible due to necessity. Yet, if we accept the possibility of terrorism as an alternative model, this excuse melts away, particularly in cases where pursuing national development as a means to strengthening the ummah entails cooperating with kuffar against Muslims. So weighing these two options, the potential sin of spilling impermissible blood (and it is not even certain that it is impermissible, since killing non-combatants is allowed if it is a necessary part of achieving a strategic goal) or violating implicit covenants (and is not certain that this applies due to systematic and repeated violations of the rights of Muslims living in enemy lands) is clearly a much lesser harm than assisting kuffar against and helping them to be dominant over Muslims and replacing parts of sharia with laws from other legal-religious traditions. Furthermore, considering the current situation of the Muslims, where regimes collaborating with our enemies impose kufr upon the Muslims in both the legal and educational systems, and that the developmentalist model leads not to strength but immersion in dunya and perpetual deferral of jihad, then the harm of the developmentalist path becomes even more apparent. From this perspective, it becomes apparent that state capture, while have benefits for da'wah and the wellbeing of Muslims, is a kind of trap which necessarily entails trading the akhira for the dunya to some extent. The state and its worldly benefits act as a kind of bait, allowing Islamic groups to seize it in exchange for turning away from essential Islamic rulings such as implementation of hudud and participation in the global war on kufr.

Weighing the harms and benefits of terrorism and developmentalism While an effective strategy for state capture, turning away from direct attacks on major powers has serious drawbacks in the context of the global war on kufr. The war that was launched approximately 30 years ago against the Jews and Crusaders follows an asymmetric strategy. The outcome of each battle is relatively unimportant - it is possible to win the war without winning a single battle. The principle is to exhaust the enemy, since their cost of mobilization is much higher than that of the insurgents. This means that success depends first and foremost on continuous fighting. While state capture by Islamic groups may feel good, it ultimately detracts from the ultimate strategic objectives by reducing the enemy's "burn rate." This is especially problematic when cessation of hostilities depends on making fundamental religious compromises, such as respecting national boundaries imposed by the enemy, not implementing jizya, not fully implementing hudud punishments, and so forth. This ultimately goes back to two core problems - 1) belief in the necessity of modern modes of industrial production 2) proscription of terrorism Both of these are aggressively promoted in curricula circulating among Muslim populations. These two conceptual fallacies are closely interconnected, because terrorism makes it extremely difficult to develop an industrial base, and terrorism is the most effective strategy for degrading the integrity of hegemonic powers without and industrial base. If you believe that confronting the West requires heavy industry, you cannot sponsor terrorism, because modern modes of production require integration into global supply chains and high levels of international cooperation. And if you do not embrace terrorism, you have to seek to obtain technology to be able to compete in conventional or hybrid warfare contexts. Since there is doubt about the permissibility of terrorism, in terms of fiqh, it is necessary to weigh these options against each other, according to the principle of choosing the lesser evil. Terrorism can involve potentially sinful actions, such as attacking targets where it is known that those who are impermissible to deliberately kill (such as women and children) are present. It also may entail potential violation of implicit covenants of security. On the other hand, seeking to develop modern states and the modes of production that go along with them requires 1) submitting to international law, 2) reinforcing the legitimacy of states that are hostile toward Islam and the Muslims and cooperating with them, 3) leaving off jihad. The first two issues may entail kufr. 1) replacing the zakat/jizya paradigm with a citizenship model rooted in the Western, Judeo-Christian legal-religious tradition is replacing a key element of Allah's sharia with corrupt and arbitrary manmade laws. 2) International cooperation for the sake of technological production often requires technological cooperation which entails helping to make kuffar dominant over Muslims. For example, NATO membership greatly boosts Turkey's technological capacity, but it requires a pledge to support disbelievers against believers which is kufr even if they never act upon it. In other cases, it entails impermissible actions such as selling materials to hostile disbelievers that increase their war-making capacity, such as oil and gas, iron, or other essential minerals. The third issue, abandoning jihad, is not kufr but if we consider participation in the current war as being fardh 'ayn, or an individual obligation, it is a serious sin. The interpretation that it is necessary to build up productive capacity before confronting hostile powers such as the United States is simply invalid. Why? Because it causes more harm than benefit, leading Muslims ever deeper into dependency on our enemies and neglect of our religion.

Geopolitical deferral of pain So many haram things lead to short term gain or pleasure, but long term harm and pain. This is visible in the dunya, a confirmation of Allah's promise regarding the akhira. Conversely, obeying Allah often leads to short term discomfort or difficulty, but in the long term leads to blessings and happiness. This relates to the time, but you can also see it in space - acts of disobedience often defer pain away from the sinner and onto others. A simple example is theft or crooked business dealings, where someone harms another to obtain benefit for themselves. A more complex example is Muslims migrating to the West, where the migrants escape oppression in their homelands, but ultimately worsen the structural oppression by strengthening the position of puppet regimes and bolstering the economy of the system that backs them. The dynamic of spatial and temporal deferral of suffering is visible not only in individual issues, but also in political issues such as Islamic movements embracing nationalism or allying with kuffar. It is important to be aware of this dimension to avoid excessively praising movements that bring localized benefit to Muslims while causing generalized harm. For example, the freeing of the prisoners in Syria and the fall of the Nusayri regime is undoubtedly a great achievement, but by embracing nationalism and security cooperation with the West, it ultimately fortifies the Western presence which causes untold suffering and corruption of the religion in the entire region. A nationalist perspective shifts the focus toward the benefits for Syria which are undeniable, and for which the mujahideen deserve praise and recognition. However, we cannot allow this to cause us to lose sight of the treachery, corruption, and neglect of Allah's religion that accompanied this great victory. Intellectual laziness leads people to two extremes - those who simply write off the Syrian revolution and jihad forces as puppets of the West or apostates, and those that justify all of the treachery and heresy as permissible tactics and praise the new regime in absolute terms. A victory which requires embracing nationalism and allying with enemies of Allah is not a pure victory, but also a deferral of necessary pain - some of it to the future, some of it to other regions, and some of it to the akhira.

Evaluating success of Islamic insurgency: national vs. global perspective Islamic insurgency must be evaluated globally, not nationally. The rise of khilafa requires the fall of the nation-state. For example, one can say say that IS's project in Syria and Iraq failed, but (irrespective of whatever other criticisms there are of the movement) it greatly potentiated multiple Islamic insurgencies in Africa, as well as destabilizing the West by empowering the far-right. al Qaeda in Yemen may have failed to take power, but plots originating from Yemen such as the Charlie Hebdo attack and the airline laptop bombing plot inflicted disproportionate security costs on the West and also accelerated the polarization of Western societies. Hamas is the most socially acceptable jihadi group because of the nationalistic framing of its struggle, but it still has global benefits. Sinwar famously said that Tufan al Aqsa would ignite a regional war (this was his intention), and we are now seeing this prediction become a reality. This war has implications that will ultimately be quite detrimental to the West and Israel. Those who don't want this model are either munafiqeen who don't actually want jihad or sharia, or those who have been deceived by propaganda narratives. More basic propaganda narratives usually portray the mujahideen as terrorists and their actions as Islamically illegitimate. More complex narratives inflate the importance of technology and demean those who do not adopt Western lifestyles, convincing colonized peoples that assimilation into a system controlled by their enemies is a matter of absolute necessity. The effectiveness of these narratives in convincing Muslims to abandon jihad and embrace nationalism is in no way a proof that the efforts of the mujahideen have failed. Rather, it's just another dimension of the struggle.

The reason the third model is so heavily condemned is not because it is actually morally inferior to the first two (in reality, it entail, but rather because it has the best cost-benefit ratio. Like slavery and child marriage, it is demonized because of its potency as a threat to the foundation of the modern ideological-economic world system. The second model is likewise somewhat more accepted in mainstream discourse because it is less of a threat, since it is still indirectly dependent on the hegemonic system via Russia and China. From an aqeeda perspective, the third model is superior because it is the only model that allows actualizing al wala wal bara in the present context. This is due to the political implications of participation in globalized technological supply chains. The two big positives I see from this war are first the potential to weaken both the liberal/Jewish dominated world system and Iran (and by extension, Russia and China). The second is the potential for more Muslims to wake up to the futility of the second theory of modern warfare and realize the necessity (and therefore permissibility, even if it contains some elements that might be otherwise haram) of the third model. There are signs that the aerial bombing campaign has been quite effective. Although Iran has managed to recover and increase the pace of its strikes on Israel and Jewish/Crusader proxies such as the GCC, it is doubtful that they will be able to sustain this for long. This is not because their military production is insufficiently secured - it is likely that a large portion of missile and drone production is relatively immune to aerial attacks. Rather, it is because of how dependent their economy is in general on infrastructure which is vulnerable to aerial attack. The attrition ratio of long range attack drones to interceptor missiles is very good, but the ratio of cost of airstrikes (or even launched ground operations) on oil and gas infrastructure to the damage it inflicts is better. Iran can continue to produce drones and missiles short term even if their oil and gas infrastructure is destroyed or captured, but long term, they depend on these exports to import the components they need to continue production. The loss of this infrastructure has many other effects, including affecting the long term viability of the military, industry and the capacity for governance. Iran's economy is much more diversified than the Gulf states, so the state can likely survive even with a crippled oil and gas sector, but it is unlikely that they can maintain missile and drone strikes over the long term. Russia and China might extend credit to them to maintain critical imports, but this will have a real impact on China in particular. China also does not have a real interest in prolonging the conflict, because higher energy prices greatly affect their export competitiveness. This means Iran will likely face pressure to deescalate precisely because of their hybrid warfare model. To summarize, the current conflict highlights material and political limitations to the Iranian theory of hybrid warfare, due to dependence on globalized supply chains and heavy centralized infrastructure. Mainstream Muslims under the sway of Ikhwani discourse (the types that somehow think that Hamas et al are the only legitimate mujahideen) tend to put a lot of hope into Iran's approach, often justifying friendliness with the Rafidah because of it. I ask that Allah make this war a means of waking up more of these brothers and sisters to the reality, just as the war in Gaza was a means of guidance to many who were previously under the spell of Madkhali discourse.